Moral Justification

Enquiry Ideals: Research

J.E. Sieber , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

three.2 Risk and Benefit

The perspective of scientists is influenced by their inquiry objectives, civilization, and experience with the circumstances of those studied. A narrow perspective may negate the promise of scientific inquiry to be beneficial. Research on risk and do good seeks to broaden this perspective and heighten the value of inquiry to subjects, their community, researchers, their institution, funders, science, and social club. Risks and benefits are generic to all upstanding considerations and research topics. All the same, specific risks vary markedly in relation to the research context (due east.m., laboratory, community, school, workplace, infirmary, prison house).

3.ii.1 Risk, wrong, and impairment

How does 1 weigh moral wrongs (e.g., deceiving subjects), versus risks of damage? What determines perception of gamble and condom? How can this determination exist reached accurately and usefully? How can risk, incorrect or impairment exist assessed?

iii.2.two Benefit and promise

Do good is the moral justification of research, just it is ofttimes only taken on faith that research is, by definition, beneficial. How are benefits identified, estimated, and maximized? Who benefits? Oft research has little likelihood of benefiting lodge; does the researcher therefore accept a duty to benefit the subjects or their customs directly via some services, products, training, or job opportunities connected with the inquiry?

3.2.3 Gamble/benefit cess

The price of scientific knowledge is run a risk and fiscal price. How is hazard justified in relation to benefit? What is the risk or cost to society of inquiry opportunities that are lost due to financial, regulatory, or political pressures? (e.g., see Rosenthal and Rosnow 1984.)

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Explanation: Conceptions in the Social Sciences

H. Westmeyer , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

Explanation is an important goal of any scientific inquiry. An explanation is a argument or business relationship which makes what is to be explained clearer than it was earlier and promotes its understanding. In that location are dissimilar kinds of entities to be explained in the social sciences: events or phenomena; scientific laws or theories; the functioning of systems; the meaning of expressions, ideas, or behaviors; actions in the sense of their (moral) justification. The almost of import kind are events and phenomena. The question 'What is the proper construction and which are the characteristics of a good or adequate caption of events or phenomena?' is at the centre of a lively debate between the proponents and opponents of unlike models of scientific explanation. The best known ones are the deductive-nomological model of scientific caption and the statistical-relevance model of probabilistic caption. These models presuppose a comprehensive and well articulated knowledge base of operations which is non bachelor in most of the social sciences. More realistic contempo alternatives are the model of aleatory explanation and, as the most promising one, the embedding theory of scientific explanation which will presumably play a leading role in future discussions of the result.

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War: Anthropological Aspects

C.R. Nordstrom , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

1 Defining War

Neither the ii world wars nor the several hundred local and regional wars since 1900 have brought united states of america closer to a shared understanding of state of war. Most scholars accept a basic definition of war as the deployment of violence to force opponents to comply with one's will. War is organized, grouping-level, armed aggression rooted in hierarchies of dominance which assume winners and losers in a contest over resources, people, and power. Yet war is divers differently by the winners and the losers, by historical perspective, by soldiers and pacifists—and in each instance the definitions are more politically charged than factually correct. For example, freedom fighter, terrorist, insurgent, rebel, traitor, and soldier are all terms variously practical to the same actors past different groups seeking to maximize their own political and moral justifications. Governments define war in their own interests, and militaries are loath to admit strategies that entail civilian casualties, torture, and human rights abuses. The well-nigh basic understanding of state of war is afflicted by differential and biased reporting; for example, casualty statistics for Earth War Ii vary by millions, depending on the nationality and viewpoint of the researcher. Controlling the definitions of state of war are integral to the waging of state of war (Sluka 1992).

The ethnographic study of state of war and peace has added a new dimension in the understanding of political violence. This academic research has demonstrated that war is a far more than circuitous reality than classical definitions positing a violent contest between two or more military machine seeking a armed forces, and thus political, victory (Warren 1993, Nordstrom and Robben 1995). Soldiers often battle unarmed civilians and not each other—axiomatic from the indigenous cleansing of the Yugoslav forces in Bosnia and Kosovo or the two one thousand thousand deaths in Sudan'due south civil war. Paramilitaries, private militias, death squads, and roving bands of armed predatory gangs patrol warzones. Some operate at the behest of state forces while others are independent of all sovereign or rebel command. Mercenary forces are a global miracle today, and range from breezy groups such as the Yugoslav mercenaries fighting in Fundamental Africa to the formal Executive Outcome organization, comprised of quondam apartheid South African soldiers, who banker with governments likewise equally rebel groups. Battlezones are also home to looters, sex activity workers, criminals, and profiteers. Warzones are a boutique of international artillery and supplies merchants who reap billions of dollars yearly worldwide. International nongovernmental organizations are plant in all warzones today, providing services ranging from conflict resolution to humanitarian and development aid. Finally, the fronts of wars are dwelling to the inhabitants. Regardless of formal military regulations mandating the legal role of women, children, and the aged in state of war, all of these people fight for survival when they find themselves on the frontlines. Armed or unarmed, women defend homes and towns, children are forced to accept upwardly arms and fight, and the aged battle forced sieges. The unscrupulous sell out their neighbors for a few coins, and the altruistic set upwards medical clinics, schools and trade routes to provide critical resources under battery.

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Culture: Contemporary Views

R.A. Shweder , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

6 'Culture': Pop Objections and Common Misattributions

Within anthropology there have been many critiques of the idea of civilisation. Some are associated with a fright of 'the ethnography of deviation.' Some with doubts most the grounds and authority of 'ethnographic representation.' Some with a renewed interest in, or fear of, a universal civilizing project. Some with claims virtually the emergence of a cosmopolitan capitalist economic system. Many reasons have been advanced for doubting the usefulness of the culture concept. But are they persuasive or decisive reasons? Those who keep to embrace some diversity of the Kroeber and Kluckholn definition of 'culture' tend to believe that their thought of civilization does not carry about of the implications that are the supposed grounds for various anticultural critiques.

For example, the Kroeber and Kluckholn definition of 'culture' does not really imply that 'whatever is, is okay.' It is important to recognize that valid social criticism and questions of moral justification are not ruled out by the 'standard view' of 'culture.' Nothing in the Kroeber and Kluckhohn formulation suggests that the things that other peoples want are in fact truly desirable or that the things that other peoples think are of value are actually of value. Consensus does not add together up to moral truth. In other words, a definition of culture per se is not a theory of the 'adept.' From a moral signal of view, one need not throw out the idea of culture simply because some tyrant puts the word 'culture' to some misuse, or considering at times some ethnic groups enter into geopolitical conflict.

The idea of culture also does non imply passive credence of received do or that human being beings lack 'agency,' a common claim amongst anticulture theorists. Indeed, many proculture theorists find it amazing to see the idea of 'agency' or 'intentionality' used as synonyms for 'resistance to culture' in the discourse of 'anticulture' theorists. Fifty-fifty fully rational, fully empowered, fully 'agentic' man beings detect that membership in some particular tradition of meanings and values is an essential status for personal identity and individual happiness. Human beings who are 'liberationists' are no more than agentic than 'fundamentalists,' and neither stands outside some tradition of pregnant and value.

The idea of culture also does not imply the absenteeism of argue, contestation, or dispute among members of a grouping. Nor does it necessarily imply the being of within group homogeneity in knowledge, conventionalities, or practice. Every cultural system has experts and novices; ane does not stop existence a member of a common culture simply because cultural knowledge is distributed and someone knows much more than you do about (eastward.g.) how to acquit a funeral or utilise for a mortgage. One does not end being a member of a common culture just because there are factions in the community. The claim that in that location are between grouping cultural differences has never implied the absence of inside group differentiation or that in that location is no variation around the mean. The idea of 'culture' does not imply that every item of civilization is in the possession or consciousness of every member of that culture. The thought of culture only directs our attention to those ideas well-nigh what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient that are acquired by virtue of membership in some grouping. Not everything has to be shared for a 'culture' to exist. Members of a cultural customs exercise not ever agree about this or that, merely they exercise accept an interest in each other's ideas nigh what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient because those ideas (and related practices) have a bearing on the perpetuation of their style of life, and what they share is that collective inheritance. Since the standard view does not assume that a civilisation is a well-bounded, stock-still, and homogeneous block, the critique of the concept of 'civilization' that starts with the observation of internal variation and ends 'therefore at that place is no cultural system' should have been a nonstarter.

The idea of civilization also does not imply that other kinds of peoples are 'other,' in the sense of being less than human or possessing qualities that entitle us to arbitrate in their way of life. We alive in a multicultural world consisting (as Joseph Raz has put it) 'of groups and communities with diverse practices and beliefs, including groups whose beliefs are inconsistent with one another.' The aspirations (a) non to lose your cultural identity, (b) not to digest to mainstream pressures, (c) non to exist scattered throughout the urban center, country or earth, (d) not to glorify the Diaspora, and (e) not to bring together the highly individualistic and migratory multinational, multiracial but (in many means) monocultural cosmopolitan elite are real and legitimate aspirations, and those aspirations cannot be properly understood by treating them as illusions. They are certainly not the only legitimate aspirations in a multicultural globe; there is much that tin be said in favor of a liberal cosmopolitan life. Simply they are legitimate aspirations. Fifty-fifty in a 'global' globe, cultural communities and ethnic groups are not going to disappear. Nosotros cannot avert the question, what course does and should multiculturalism take in our emerging postmodern club (see Daedalus 2000)? Possibly that is i reason that then many social scientists and public policy analysts look to anthropology for a useful concept of 'culture,' not for no concept of culture at all.

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Terrorism, Human Rights and Ethics: A Modelling Approach

G.A. Hersh , in Improving Stability in Developing Nations through Automation 2006, 2006

3 ETHICAL Analysis

In this section a number of unlike approaches are applied to investigate the contexts in which terrorism might be justified, as well as the circumstances which lead to it. Where appropriate, problems relevant to counter-terrorism will be considered in this section, with a more all-encompassing discussion in Department 4. Upstanding questions of interest include the following:

one.

In what circumstances terrorist acts can be considered ethically justified or at to the lowest degree permissible. It should be noted that, analogously to other moral issues, in that location may be degrees of moral justification or lack of it ( Corlett, 2003).

2.

Whether it is justified to append homo rights in the right against terrorism and, if so, in which circumstances and which rights.

iii.

How real the threat of terrorism is.

4.

Why more than attending is given to terrorism than road deaths, aids, famine and violations of human rights, all of which result in much higher numbers of deaths and injuries

Questions one and ii will be discussed in this section and Department 4 respectively and questions three and 4 will be considered in Section 5.

It has been suggested that 'Terrorist attacks by the groups victimized by the Nazis, for example, would inappreciably take deserved any negative evaluations.' (Lutz et al., 2004). This indicates the type of extreme situation in which terrorist acts may be ethically justified, but also raises questions. For instance, would it have been justified for these groups to bear out attacks on the children of prominent Nazis, bold this would have been feasible in practice?

All the same, the issue is much wider than terrorism on its ain and relates to whether it is ever justified to use violence and, if so, in what circumstances. Moral positions should preferably be coherent and consistent. Therefore, the labelling of particular acts every bit 'terrorist' rather than, for instance, 'warfare' should not affect ethical judgements most them. Discussions about the circumstances in which the use of violence might be justified are part of the wider argument about the relationship between ends and ways or consequentialist and deontological ideals. It has been suggested that the utilise of political violence cannot be justified unless all channels of not-violent protest take been exhausted (Audi, 1971). This argument is problematic, since information technology is not always articulate what channels of non-trigger-happy protest are available and the need for change may be urgent due to the existing state of violence and oppression. However, it tin can never be guaranteed that political violence will be successful in achieving its aims.

Several different authors have suggested conditions under which the use of political violence or terrorism might be justified. These include (Corlett, 2003) the use of terrorism by a morally innocent private (notwithstanding moral innocence is defined) to defend themselves or other morally innocent people confronting a pregnant injustice using terrorist activities which are directed proportionately and simply against those guilty of committing acts of meaning injustice. Further atmospheric condition include replicability i.e. moral justification of the use of terrorism by others in similar circumstances, planning for the use of terrorism to achieve the abeyance of the injustice and, previous attempts to employ non-violent means, if this is feasible. Farther suggestions include the justification of the use of political violence (Narveson, 1991) to preclude firsthand injury or longer range threats to oneself or others and to prevent or rectify the loss of legitimate liberty by oneself or others, every bit well as the proffer that the use of political violence is probably non justified to obtain conditions of a minimally acceptable life fifty-fifty when there are no other means available to do this or promote a better life for oneself, a particular grouping or people in general. I would disagree with the contention expressed by Narveson and others that there is not a cardinal right to an (approximately equal share of the globe'south natural resource and socially produced goods. The departure is a divergence primarily of political philosophy or ideology and only to a lesser extent of ethics. Even so, this departure in philosophy volition affect any analysis of the ethical justification of using terrorism to access basic needs or a fair share of the earth's resources, bold no other ways are available to do this.

three.1 Consequentialist Approaches

The ethical analysis of terrorism has about oftentimes been in terms of utilarian and, in item, consequentialist ethics, involving an overall assessment of the probable benefits and harms. Whether or not there are circumstances in which terrorism can exist justified is clearly controversial and there are opinions on both sides. Consequentialist arguments have been fabricated both for and against terrorism (Hare, 1984; Corlett, 2003), based on whether on not terrorism results in an increase or decrease of adept in society. It has been argued that terrorism is always morally unjustified, equally it uses terror, is coercive, infringes rights and harms the innocent (Wellman, 1979). This has been countered by the suggestion that harming or threatening to impairment others and producing feelings of terror are insufficient to make it morally unjustified, as punishing wrongdoers includes a degree of damage and, for instance, civil disobedience and non vehement straight action against racial segregation in the southern USA made many segregationists very agape, but was morally justified due to the evil inherent in segregation (Corlett, 2003).

According to consequentialist ethics, terrorist acts are justifiable if they lead to better consequences than the alternatives. The historical evidence is difficult to interpret with opinions both that terrorist violence generally results in fierce repression and acts counter to political progress (Laquer, 1987) and that it has oftentimes contributed to progressive developments (Coser, 1966). It is generally difficult or impossible to predict the affect of a terrorist act or serial of act and whether they will contribute to or impede the accomplishment of goals. However it is common to undertake acts with uncertain outcomes (Held, 1991). The deviation relates to the apply of violence which requires a greater certainty of positive outcomes for its justification. Withal, the existing situation may also exist characterized past farthermost violence, which will definitely continue unless activeness is taken to terminate information technology. (Held, 1991). A particular result is raised by the oppression of minority groups by majority groups (Corlett, 2003). Here, in consequentialist terms, the overall balance of benefits and harms will depend on the relative weights given to the evil of oppression and the resulting disadvantage, discrimination and persecution, any advantages accruing to the majority grouping as a consequence of this oppression and the psychological and spiritual harm that oppression causes to oppressors. Every bit in the instance of definitions of terrorism, an inconsistency in the utilarian evaluation of terrorist acts which hurt non-combatants has been noted, with those carried out by 1's own or friendly states generally considered acceptable and those carried out past unfriendly states unacceptable (Coady, 1985).

3.2 Simply War Theory

Only state of war theory (Bauhn, 2005; Thompson, 2005) has two categories, which consider the justification for going to war and the ways in which the war is waged respectively. However, it should exist noted that, although just state of war theory aims to restrict the occurrences of state of war and eliminate the worst atrocities and provides reasons for forbidding violence, state of war, terror and counter-terror (Meggle, 2005b), the process of regulating state of war and giving it rules also legitimates war and makes it acceptable. The problematical features of applying just war theory to terrorism include the requirement for a right determination authority and an open declaration of state of war (Thompson, 2005). One of the factors which presents a context probable to atomic number 82 to terrorism is exclusion from admission to decision making and policy formulation and lack of recognition. Therefore terrorist acts will generally not be commanded past a 'correct decision authority'. Terrorist acts are often carried out by groups without national self-determination. Notwithstanding, their non-recognition past other national governments and consistent classification as criminals rather than enemy forces is often based on cocky-interest. This raises the upshot of whether and in what circumstances national governments should recognize more credible representatives of the people than an unpopular and abusive government (Burchael, 1990).

There are two main principles (Coady, 2005) for the conduct of a only war:

1.

The principle of discrimination, which restricts the types of weapons and methods that can exist used and the targets that tin be considered legitimate. Uninvolved outsiders and large calibration 'collateral impairment' are specifically excluded.

ii.

The principle of proportionality, which limits the degree of response in terms of the costs of the resulting harm and the benefits of the achievement of the war aims.

The principle of double issue tin exist applied to permit impairment to non-combatants in some circumstances in a 'just' war. However, it is not universally accepted and is open to corruption, particularly through ignoring the principle of proportionality (Coady, 2005). This is particularly important, since it has been estimated that the ratio of soldier to civilian casualties has inverse from 9 to one to i to nine over the twentieth century (Stremlau, 1998) due to a combination of the direct targeting of civilians and 'collateral damage'. The term collateral damage is itself problematical and indicates the treatment of the potential victims as purely a means to an end, contrary to the Kantian requirement that individuals should exist treated as an end in themselves (Hill, 1991).

Only state of war theory depends at least in office on the drawing of boundaries, including those between people who can legitimately be killed and those who cannot, circumstances in which this killing is and is not legitimate, and betwixt intended as opposed to merely foreseen killing. This raises the event of who makes someone a member of a war machine force rather than a murderer and who gives out licenses to kill. It has been suggested that the 'authorities of a nation state' is an insufficient reply. Analogously to the claims past most armies that their war is a just war, 'terrorists' tin can equally claim that their violence is justified. The categories of 'innocent', 'soldier' and 'alleged war' are based on a mutually accepted authority structure from which the organizations and individuals who commit terrorist acts are excluded (Baier, 1991).

The distinction between combatants and non-combatants has been questioned (Held, 1991). In detail, at that place are almost 300,000 child soldiers worldwide and children under xv participated in armed conflicts in 27 countries in 1997-8. About 20 countries, including the United states and UK, recruit children under 18. The bulk of child soldiers are adolescents, though some countries recruit or forcefulness children as young equally vii into war machine duty (Salt of World, 2000). Many of these children, including in the richer countries, are from poor families with few options. Others are forcibly rounded up. This then raises the issue of the moral distinction betwixt combatants and non-combatants, particularly when the combatants include children and young people who have been forcibly conscripted or joined upwardly due to poverty and the non-combatants are relatively well-off shoppers whose prosperity may be at the expense of these young people. Yet, this does not necessarily hateful that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants should exist eliminated (Held, 1991).

iii.3 Rights Ideals and Intervening Actions

Rights ideals is based on consideration of fundamental moral rights, with actions which violate these rights considered to exist incorrect. In the context of the analysis of terrorism this leads to an evaluation of the relative importance of unlike rights and decisions about which rights and whose rights it is least justifiable to violate (Held, 1991). This should include consideration of the rights violations involved in maintaining the existing system, as well as whether it is morally justifiable to violate some rights in club to ensure that other rights are respected. While not-tearing methods of ensuring respect for human being rights should be the most favoured option, it is preferable to equalize the distribution of rights violations in a transition to cease rights violations. In full general, violation of important rights should be avoided to bring about respect for less serious rights (Held, 1991). Although at that place are problems of the comparative importance of different rights, this would imply that terrorism in support of the right to personal security or sufficient access to resources to run across basic needs is probable to exist justified.

Both terrorism and counter-terrorism raise issues of whether it is morally justified to impale, injure or torture one person in society to relieve a large number of other people. With regards to situations leading to terrorism, the existing state of affairs may be categorized by frequent serious violations of human rights, including massacres, disappearances and torture, and the repeated failure of attempts to achieve modify by peaceful means. In the instance of anti-terrorism, it may be believed that drastic action is required to avert a potential and serious terrorist threat. All the same, according to the principle of intervening activeness a person is not morally required to execute one person in order to save others, every bit information technology is the intervening action of another person which leads to these deaths (Bauhn, 2005). A lack of moral requirement is, of class, not the same as an ethical prohibition and an ethical examination of the issues is required. This will require the development of an ethics of extreme circumstances, which confronts the hard choices to be made in a realistic and empathetic style. In that location may also be a demand for this ideals to consider likelihood factors, since the deaths and injuries as a result of actions carried out to save others volition be definite, whereas, in that location is a hypothetical element associated with deaths and injuries that have not however occurred, though it can generally be assumed that repressive regimes with a loftier incidence of torture, disappearances and extralegal executions will proceed with this behaviour. Information technology should be noted that in that location may exist analogies between earnest takers who risk harming innocent people to bring about political goals in order to reduce the number of lives lost overall and those who are willing to risk killing innocent hostages to avoid negotiating with 'terrorists' for the same reason (Held, 1991).

3.4 Virtue Ideals and the Ethics of Care

Virtue ethic supports actions which build skilful character and involves a feedback relationship betwixt behave and the development of 'virtuous' grapheme (Oakley, 1998). It is based on the premise that a person with moral virtues is more than probable to comport ethically than someone who purely follows rules. Virtue ethics assumes that the main ethical question concerns desirable character and recognises that bear has an effect on the person. This gives a feedback system, as illustrated in figure 2, in which ethical conduct has an effect on character and the development of virtues and these virtues lead to farther ethical behaviour. Virtue ethics is also consequent with spiritually motivated approaches to ethics, since information technology could exist considered to encourage personal and spiritual evolution through upstanding behaviour. However even 'virtuous' people sometimes make mistakes or practise things they regret. Virtue ethics is likewise consistent with an understanding that the means used may shape the ends obtained.

Figure ii. Upstanding Behaviour and Virtuous Grapheme

The awarding of virtue ethics in the context of terrorism is interesting, every bit 'terrorists' are oft labelled every bit bad and indeed inhuman people. However, is this ever the case? It can probably be accepted that the use of violence for whatever reasons has a psychologically and psychically damaging effect, regardless of the reasons it is used. However, the surrounding circumstances and the motivation for the use of violence are likely to take be important in determining the effects on character.

The ideals of intendance is a context based approach to preserving relationships. Terrorism clearly has a significant impact on a number of relationships. It is often carried out past people who are powerless to claiming power relationships. This occurs both at the macro level of wider political and economic relationships and at the micro level of, for instance, a particular group of oppressers and oppressed, who are transformed into victims and terrorists. It likewise has an touch on on many other relationships, including within families and communities.

3.5 Multi-Loop Action Learning

Multi-loop action learning can exist used to investigate the barriers to ethical action and persuading individuals and organisations of the value of such action. It involves the addition of quadruple loop action learning to existing methods (Nielson, 1996) and is illustrated in figure three. Single loop action learning is about changing behaviour, rather than learning about ideals and changing values, whereas double loop action learning involves changes in values (generally of individuals) as well as behaviour (Nielson, 1996). Triple and quadruple loop action learning involve changes in the underlying traditions or ethos of the organisation and surrounding society respectively, as well every bit changes in values and behaviour.

Figure three. Single, Double, Triple and Quadruple Loop Learning

As the model illustrates, actions by individuals result from decisions motivated by their values and these values are situated in a context of organizational and societal values. Therefore changing these individual values volition generally as well require changes in the social context and institutional and wider societal values. As indicated in the previous section, the context in which terrorism takes identify is marked by the following:

•

An acceptance or even glorification of violence.

•

Marginalization, discrimination and social exclusion, including from determination making.

•

The dehumanization or instrumentalisation of particular social groups.

•

Mythmaking and propaganda.

•

The conventionalities that ends justify means.

•

Vested interests.

These factors contribute to the ethos of the wider club in which terrorist and counter-terrorist acts take place. Since even groups which are trying to achieve pregnant change are part of the wider order, both potentially terrorist and counter-terrorist organizations are influenced past this ethos. This then leads to a focus on the desired results rather than the means of achieving them, an instrumentalisation or dehumanization of potential victims and a lowering of the barriers confronting violence. This results in an system or a local social context with the potential to commit terrorist acts or acts which violate homo rights in the service of counter-terrorism. Individuals are influenced past both the wider lodge and their firsthand social context. Due to social sanctions and the need experienced by nearly people to belong and to be accepted it is often very difficult to espouse values or conduct in a way that is counter to the ethos of the system or local social context.

However, pressures of this type practice not excuse individuals from moral responsibility for their acts or make information technology impossible for them to behave in a way that is counter to the ethos of the organization or local social context. It does however make information technology more than difficult to do so and often the cost for standing against the organisation can be high, every bit discussed in (Hersh, 2004) in the context of whistleblowing. The forward link from the wider social context to the individual has been discussed. All the same, as indicated in figure 3, in that location are also feedback links from the private to the system and the wider society. Therefore, through changes in their behaviour and values individuals can influence their organizations, the local context and the wider lodge. However, this blazon of action is virtually effective and the likelihood of victimization is reduced when individuals join together in organizations to affect modify.

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